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RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY?: LESSONS
FROM THE HAITIAN CRISIS*
Harold Hongju Koh**
Y subject today is a question: Democracy and Human RightsMin United States Foreign Policy? I ask that question because it
centrally occupies the minds of most American international
human rights lawyers. My students sometimes ask, "[e]xactly what is an
international human rights lawyer?" My working definition: an interna-
tional human rights lawyer is an international lawyer who got mad. In a
democracy, human rights are both political and personal. For that reason,
this lecture will cover a bit of both. Before I turn to some of the policy
questions raised by democracy and human rights in United States foreign
policy, particularly by the continuing crisis in Haiti, let me describe how
my own career as an international lawyer evolved toward the interna-
tional human rights work that I am doing now.
My parents came to this country as immigrants more than forty years
ago. My father, the late Kwang Lim Koh, was a young professor of inter-
national law at Seoul National University in Korea. He came here, as
many of you have done, as a foreign student to complete an L.L.M and an
S.J.D. at an American law school. When the first democratic government
of Korea was elected in 1960, he was drawn into political life. He became
the Korean Ambassador to the United Nations, and later the Deputy
Chief of Mission at the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. In 1960,
the Korean government was overthrown by a brutal coup d'etat and my
father became, in effect, a political exile. We sought refuge in New Ha-
ven, Connecticut, where my parents started teaching a course in East
Asian Law at Yale Law School. With a few detours, I have continued to
reside in New Haven ever since.
My own career began in private practice as an international business
lawyer, conducting arbitrations, transnational litigation, and export con-
* This article is a lightly revised and annotated version of the sixteenth Roy R. Ray
Lecture, delivered at Southern Methodist University School of Law on March 3, 1994.
Portions were subsequently published, in amended form, in Harold Hongju Koh, The
"Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994).
** Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Direc-
tor, Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale University.
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trol counseling. In 1983, I became a government lawyer specializing in
public international law and the law of United States foreign policy. I
began teaching civil procedure and international business and trade law,
and gradually shifted to teaching international organizations and interna-
tional legal theory. In my academic work, I pursued a number of para-
digms, the first captured in the title of my article, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs.' In 1991 I published a sequel,
Transnational Public Law Litigation,2 which argued that an emerging
transnational analog exists to the familiar domestic phenomenon of pub-
lic law litigation. In the same way American civil rights lawyers have
invoked principles of American public law to seek reform of various do-
mestic institutions, including prisons, hospitals, and school systems, I ar-
gued that private litigants increasingly turn to United States courts to
enforce international human rights norms against United States and for-
eign government officials when they act in violation of internationally
recognized standards.
Shortly after the article was published, a number of students appeared
in my office and asked if I was willing to teach an international human
rights clinic. In the words of your local celebrity, H. Ross Perot, they
asked, "would I actually do transnational public law litigation, not just
talk about it?" In the time-honored law professor's tradition, I said that I
was too busy and that they should go away. But, in the best student tradi-
tion, they persisted, and soon thereafter the Lowenstein International
Human Rights Clinic was born.
We named the clinic after Allard Lowenstein, a graduate of Yale law
school who had been a political activist and former United States Ambas-
sador to the United Nations Human Rights Commission in the Carter
Administration. I agreed to teach the course along with Michael Ratner,
an experienced human rights litigator from New York's Center for Con-
stitutional Rights.
In the first few semesters after we established the Clinic, we filed ami-
cus briefs in a number of cases, including a suit against Ferdinand Marcos
in the Ninth Circuit. 3 In addition, we filed briefs in a number of human
rights cases in the Supreme Court, including U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain4
and Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.5 We brought petitions at the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission and a number of lawsuits in domestic court,
the first against the former Defense Minister of Guatemala, Hector
Gramajo, who had been responsible for various atrocities against
1. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988).
2. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347
(1991).
3. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (involving the extraterritorial kidnapping of Humberto Al-
varez-Machain).
5. 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (involving suit for torture under the "commercial activity"
exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
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Kanjobal Indians in the Western Highlands. We served process upon him
at his graduation from Harvard, where he was receiving a degree from
the Kennedy School of Government. 6 A number of years later we filed a
similar suit against an Indonesian general named Panjaitan who was re-
sponsible for the 1991 massacre in East Timor.
7
The case in which we were most deeply involved was a suit against the
former Dictator of Haiti, Prosper Avril, who had fled Haiti for Miami,
where he was living in a large house with several bank accounts.8
Through this lawsuit, we encountered the newly-elected government of
Haiti under the Presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In the brief period
during which we worked with the newly-elected government, I saw a
touching similarity between the Korean government that my father had
served and the fledgling government trying to get started in Haiti. When
the newly-elected government was overthrown in the fall of 1991, the stu-
dents came to me and said: "We have got to do something about Haitian
refugees. They are fleeing, being stopped on the high seas, and returned.
We cannot let this happen."
What to do? Previously, I had argued that there was a way, through
transnational public law litigation, to make government officials satisfy
internationally recognized human rights standards. Here was a chance to
vindicate this theory in real life. But if the President almost always wins
in foreign affairs, what chance did we really have? The case that we
brought, Haitian Centers Council v. Sale,9 in the next year went to the
Second Circuit seven times, and to the Supreme Court six times. During
that period, more than one hundred Yale law students and thirteen
faculty members worked on the case, logging more than twenty thousand
hours. Think about that for a second: twenty thousand hours is more
than three law school educations, all spent litigating one case. 10 In the
end we won a split decision. We lost our Supreme Court effort to chal-
lenge the Bush and Clinton policies of summarily returning all Haitians to
Haiti-a policy that continues as we speak." But in a less publicized part
of the case, we won a district court judgment that ordered the release of
more than two hundred Haitian refugees, who were being held behind
barbed wire in Guantanamo, Cuba, to the United States, where they are
now living and pursuing new lives. 12 Interestingly, at the beginning of
this case, the government filed a motion against me for Rule 11 sanctions
claiming that we had brought a "frivolous" lawsuit and asking that a ten
6. Xuncax v. Gramajo, No. 91-11564 WD (D. Mass. filed June 6, 1991).
7. Todd v. Panjaitan, No. 92-12255 WD (D. Mass. filed Sept. 17, 1992).
8. Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993). In Avril, we recently won a $41
million default judgment.
9. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
10. For an account of the case by three Yale law student participants, see Victoria
Clawson et al., Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council, 103
YALE L.J. 2337 (1994).
11. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). The direct return policy
was later modified to a policy of safe haven in July of 1994.
12. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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million dollar bond be posted before we could proceed. A ten million
dollar bond was, at the time, ten times larger than the largest bond ever
requested on a temporary restraining order in the history of the Second
Circuit.' 3 In the end, however, we prevailed on most of the counts of our
complaint and settled for $634,100 in fees and costs.
For me, the Haitian litigation was a career-transforming experience.
During the three thousand hours that I worked on the case, I was driven
by the memory of my own parents and how they had found refuge in this
country. It was because of America's willingness to take them in that I
became a lawyer. When the Haitians did precisely the same thing, how-
ever, they were summarily returned to those from whom they were
fleeing.
As the Haitian case drew to a close last spring, two events happened.
First, I went to LaGuardia Airport to meet the Haitians who arrived from
Guantanamo by court order. As we took them through the immigration
process, one Haitian came up to me and said, "Monsieur Harold, my law-
yer, my name is wrong!" For the last two years he had worn a computer-
ized arm bracelet with a bar code stamped on it like the code stamped on
a piece of meat at a grocery store. He had written a variation of the same
name on a napkin. He pointed to the napkin and said, "This is my name,
this is my name." I realized that when he was picked up off the boat, his
name had been misspelled. As I went back to change it, suddenly I real-
ized we could not. All of his rights under our injunction keyed off of the
wrong name. So I said to him, "This is your Ellis Island name. That is
your name now." He was deeply puzzled. He asked me, "What is your
name?" I said, "In this country, we spell it KOH." He answered, "Then
this is now my name." It occurred to me that the cycle had come full
circle and was beginning again. Maybe his child would become a lawyer,
maybe even an international human rights lawyer someday.
A second event that occurred about the same time was the appoint-
ment of my colleague at Yale, Drew Days, as Solicitor General of the
United States. Drew had been the Director of our Schell Center for In-
ternational Human Rights. As a result, our dean asked me to succeed
Drew with an eye toward furthering the human rights work in which I
had become deeply engaged. I saw this as an opportunity to take my
personal experience and put it into a policy perspective, thinking in
broader policy terms about the actual and desirable role of democracy
and human rights in United States foreign policy. In that capacity, I have
had occasion to evaluate the Clinton Administration's first-year record in
democracy and human rights, the subject to which I now turn.
How should we evaluate the Clinton Administration's human rights
performance thus far? Let me suggest five criteria:
1) Rhetoric;
13. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
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2) Appointments to key policy-making positions;
3) Intervention, to prevent ongoing human rights abuses;
4) Accountability, to seek remedies for past human rights abuses; and
5) Preventive Measures, to forestall future human rights abuses by, for
example, adopting international standards and treaties, promoting
institutional change, and taking measures of deterrence.
Thus far, I would rate the Clinton Administration fairly high on criteria 1)
and 2), Rhetoric and Appointments. I would give the administration a
low to failing grade in Intervention and Accountability, and say that the
jury is still out on the fifth criterion, Preventive Measures. In viewing the
situation more broadly, I have concluded that the Haitian case-study rep-
resents not only this administration's greatest failure with regard to both
democracy and human rights, but it also presents a paradigm, which I call
the "Haiti paradigm," demonstrating what can and will go wrong with the
United States human rights policy. 14
Starting with the first criterion, Rhetoric, I give President Clinton enor-
mous credit for being the first American president since Jimmy Carter to
put human rights prominently on his foreign policy agenda. Clinton's
rhetoric began with a campaign speech he gave in Milwaukee in October
1992. In addition, democracy and human rights were surprisingly promi-
nent themes in Clinton's State of the Union Address in January 1994.
Warren Christopher mentioned human rights prominently in his confir-
mation hearing as Secretary of State, and the subject emerged as a partic-
ularly strong theme in Secretary Christopher's address to the Vienna
Conference on Human Rights in June of 1993 where he made the follow-
ing statement:
[O]ver the course of the last two centuries, Americans have found
that advancing democratic values and human rights serve our deep-
est values as well as our practical interests. That is why the United
States stands with men and women everywhere who are standing up
for these principles, and that is why President Clinton has made rein-
forcing democracy and protecting human rights a pillar of our for-
eign policy . . . In this post-cold war era, we are at a new moment.
Our agenda for freedom must embrace every prisoner of conscience,
every victim of torture, every individual denied basic human rights.15
Note four things. First, Christopher went on to say, "[i]n the battle for
democracy and human rights words matter, but what we do, matters
much more."'1 6 In other words, judge us by what we do, not by what we
say. Second, he emphasized the individuals who have been denied
human rights, rather than focusing on state interests: a recognition of the
human rights revolution wrought by Nuremberg, which restored individu-
als to their proper place as subjects of international law. Third, Christo-
14. For elaboration, see Koh, supra note 1.
15. Warren Christopher, Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands, Ad-





pher focused not just on human rights, but on democracy and human
rights as interlinked objectives of United States foreign policy. Finally, he
recognized that advancing democratic values and human rights serves our
deepest values as well as our practical interests. Such statements were
the first in more than a decade by a high United States foreign policy
official acknowledging that promoting human rights can serve both our
values and our interests.
Treating human rights and democracy as a unit actually disguises two
competing rationales for promoting human rights as part of United States
foreign policy. First, consider what I call an intrinsic rationale. Namely,
we promote human rights because it is the right thing to do and because it
is consistent with our national values and identity. The second, instru-
mental reason is that promoting human rights serves our other national
interests, such as peace, security, and freedom. Secretary Christopher be-
gan by saying, "[o]ur agenda is expansive. It embraces every prisoner of
conscience, every victim of torture, every individual denied basic human
rights," language reminiscent of John F. Kennedy's famous promise in
1961 "to pay any price, bear any burden, support any friend, and oppose
any foe to secure the blessings of liberty." In fact, however, the Clinton
Administration has largely adopted the Reagan and Bush practice of pro-
moting human rights as an instrumentalist means of pursuing other na-
tional interests: promoting democracy, and through some "trickle-down"
mechanism, hoping that democracy will in turn promote human rights.
This kind of instrumental reasoning first led to President Reagan's appeal
for contra funding in the language of democracy and human rights, and
President Bush's use of the rhetoric of human rights to rally a coalition of
nations against Iraq's aggression towards Kuwait, without later invoking
the same rhetoric to condemn non-democratic human rights abuses by
countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
If a failure in the Bush Administration's human rights policy occurred,
it was caused by a lack of vision. When the cold war ended, President
Bush received a golden opportunity to define a central place for human
rights as part of our foreign policy agenda. He did preside over some
advances in human rights, particularly in Eastern Europe, South Africa
and Central America, but he never articulated a vision that would estab-
lish why human rights should be given a consistent premium. In this re-
gard, President-elect Clinton, as a candidate, was highly critical of
President Bush. He said, "President Bush doesn't recognize that our na-
tion has a higher purpose than to coddle dictators and stand aside from
the global movement towards democracy. He seems too often to prefer a
foreign policy that embraces stability at the expense of freedom."'1 7 The
question now, however, is whether President Clinton's heightened rhetor-
ical emphasis on democracy and human rights will translate into commit-
ted and principled support, or whether it will instead constitute implicit
17. Governor William J. Clinton, Speech to Univ. of Wisconsin Inst. of World Affairs
(Oct. 1, 1992).
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acceptance of a more limited human rights agenda, such as promoting
market-based democracies with hopes that human rights might benefit
because of the familiar notion that market-based democracies "do not
fight with each other." We should, therefore, ask four questions:
1) Will the Administration's rhetorical emphasis on democracy some-
how short-change human rights?
2) Will we criticize human rights violations by undemocratic but stable
regimes?
3) Will we support principles, not leaders, applying the same human
rights principles to our large allies as to our foes? and
4) How broadly will we define democracy itself? Does "democracy"
mean simply holding elections? Or do we view democracy as more
broadly encompassing respect for the rule of law, due process, re-
spect for the rights of minorities, indigenous peoples, etc?
So much for Rhetoric. What about Appointments, the second crite-
rion? It seems to me that, at least initially, the Clinton Administration's
appointments in the human rights area have been excellent. For example,
the following prominent persons have been appointed to key positions in
the Administration: John Shattuck (a former head of the American Civil
Liberty Union's Washington Office) as Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights, Democracy, and Humanitarian Affairs; Drew Days, my
Yale colleague, as Solicitor General; Doris Meissner as Commissioner of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Tim Wirth as the Under
Secretary for Global Affairs. 18
In addition, other early appointees display significant international
human rights experience, including Morton Halperin, whose nomination
was withdrawn as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Human Rights, but
who now works on the National Security Council staff, and Phil Heymann
(a Harvard law professor) who served as Deputy Attorney General. The
problem is not with the quality of these appointments, which has gener-
ally been excellent, but the extent to which these fine people have actu-
ally been listened to with regard to foreign policy. The unfortunate first
signs are that they have not. Again, Haiti provides a good example.
When Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck visited Haiti, he was
apparently shocked to discover that the situation there was far more vio-
lent and dangerous than he ever understood. He suggested that a "policy
review" might be necessary. 19 For this statement he was rebuked by the
White House. An anonymous official told the New York Times, "[I]t was
completely wrong and outrageous and there is enormous anger in the
White House ... ," referring to Shattuck's statement, but not the policy
itself. In other words, the anger was about the statement that the em-
18. Wirth began the job more interested in the environment than human rights,
although now he seems to be warming to the human rights task.
19. Steven A. Holmes, Rebuking Aide, U.S. Says Haiti Policy Stands, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1993, at A6.
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peror has no clothes, not about the defective policy itself.20
Let me turn to the third criterion: Intervention to prevent ongoing
human rights abuses. Thus far, it seems to me, the Clinton Administra-
tion has had far more failures than successes on this score. The failures
stem from a combination of a lack of recognition and a lack of resolve.
Again, the Haiti example is very instructive. Think about a nation's
human rights options as grouped at four levels: ranging from Level One,
the least interventionistic, to Level Four, the most interventionistic.
Level One, representing the lowest level of intervention, encompasses
those actions that a nation can take to promote human rights within its
own territory, without invading the sovereignty of another nation. Such
measures include, for example, adopting human rights standards as part
of national law (whether by treaty, judicial decision, or legislation), main-
taining a persistent public moral condemnation of human rights abuses
when they occur abroad, and providing temporary safe haven for refu-
gees who come here.21 Level One domestic actions also embrace moni-
toring, reporting, and certifying human rights abuses in a fair and
accurate way. These may seem like modest steps, but they are the mini-
mum human rights efforts that a nation can undertake: reporting, certifi-
cation, providing a safe haven for refugees, public condemnation, and
maintaining international law standards at home.
If you move to the second level, political intervention, you can include
diplomatic intervention, such as jaw-boning, diplomatic protests, and
multilateral and regional political action. At a third level, a nation can
consider economic intervention, the withholding of carrots and the bran-
dishing of sticks against human rights violators. Withholding of benefits
includes denying Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status, removing a country
from the General System of Preferences, denying it loans and visas, with-
drawing air landing rights, cutting off foreign aid, either security assist-
ance under section 502(b), 22 humanitarian development assistance under
section 116,23 or any other benefit that a human rights-violating nation
might seek. (For example, refusing to hold the Olympics in China could
be viewed as a denial of a benefit.) Sanctions include the range of op-
tions available to a country both unilaterally and multilaterally under its
economic laws: asset freezes, trade embargoes, bank account freezes, and
oil blockades.
20. Two months after this lecture, the Clinton Administration finally abandoned its
summary repatriation policy, shifting first to a policy of conducting shipboard refugee in-
terviews in Jamaica, and then in July of 1994 to a policy of housing fleeing Haitians in
various offshore internment camps without the possibility of resettlement in the United
States. In August 1994, the Administration began bringing fleeing Cubans to the same
sites in Guantanamo, and later to the camps in Panama.
21. Temporary safe haven does not mean asylum, but rather, a safe place of refuge,
somewhere other than the place from which the refugees are fleeing. In July 1994, the
United States finally shifted to such a temporary safe haven policy.
22. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 502(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1988).
23. Id. § 116, 22 U.S.C. § 215n (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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Finally, Level Four is military intervention, obviously the most contro-
versial. The most limited military intervention is the rescue of a country's
nationals who are facing danger, for example, the famous Israeli raid at
Entebbe. More extensive is military intervention for the purpose of pro-
viding humanitarian assistance, such as, e.g., food to Somalia, to limited
air strikes, and finally to larger-scale military activities of the kind now
being contemplated for Haiti itself. We need not now decide whether
such intervention should be unilateral or multilateral or is lawful under
domestic constitutional law or the War Powers Resolution.24 But if you
recognize that this is the list of interventionistic options, ranging from
Level One (least interventionistic) to Level Four (most interventionistic),
we should agree upon six basic propositions.
The first principle is the "blunt instrument" principle. As you go up
the ladder of intervention options, the instruments become more blunt
and inherently less capable of achieving an ultimate negotiated settle-
ment. For that reason, as the Iraq war illustrates, you must be cautious in
moving up the list.
The second principle requiring agreement is the "ratchet-up-but-not-
ratchet-down" principle. This principle maintains that, at a minimum,
you should keep the policy at Level One constant as you move up the
ladder. If, for example, you begin at Level One with moral condemna-
tion and a refugee safe haven policy and move up the ladder, the policies
should get tougher and tougher, without relaxing the lower rungs. To do
otherwise-for example, imposing economic sanctions while still re-
turning fleeing refugees-makes no sense.
The third principle is not to close the barn door after the horses have
fled. Democracies are fragile. If democratic leadership is ousted, its abil-
ity to resume power has a very short half life. To act at all to restore
democracy, you must act quickly. The greatest danger is doing too little
too late. Take, for example, economic sanctions; nothing is more point-
less than freezing a bank account after the money has been removed. It
may sound absurd, but recently certain Haitian bank accounts were fro-
zen, one of which had a balance of less than five dollars. This was a pow-
erful symbolic act having absolutely no real-world consequence. A
second, equally ineffective sanction was the imposition of an oil embargo
after oil had been stock-piled by the Haitian regime for a period of
months.
Fourth is the safe haven principle. At a minimum, a crucial policy con-
sideration should be protecting victims of human rights abuses from their
abusers. Even if victims are denied asylum, the United States should not
send them back, thereby aiding and abetting human rights abusers. No
more powerful an intellect than Warren Christopher stated this in 1980 as
Deputy Secretary of State, when he said, "[O]ur support for human rights
may offer the only long-term solution to our most pressing problem on
24. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1988).
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the international agenda, the problem of refugees .... When a govern-
ment respects the human rights of its citizens, refugees are a rare
phenomenon." 25
Principle number five is regional burden-sharing. The problem is re-
storing democracy. The symptom is refugees. A regional, integrated ap-
proach is necessary to address both problems. If you deal multilaterally
with the problem of restoration of democracy, then the refugee solution
only need be an interim solution. But, if you deal only with the refugee
problem, the heart of the matter is never addressed.
Sixth and finally, the United States must defend the principle of non-
neutrality in the face of gross violations of human rights. If mass torture,
rape, and genocide are occurring, it is insufficient for the United States
simply to enter and act as a broker or mediator between opposing sides.
A nation committed to human rights, whether for instrumental or intrin-
sic purposes, cannot be neutral in the face of these types of illegal
activities.
If the United States had applied these six principles in Haiti in 1991,
what would we have done? Under the blunt instrument principle, we
properly refrained from quick military intervention. However, under the
barn door principle, we should have moved immediately toward full-scale
economic sanctions. At the same time, we should have maintained our
Level One position, aggressively criticizing and condemning the coup,
putting in place a humane temporary safe-haven program, and engaging
in active diplomatic intervention. Under the regional burden-sharing
rule, we should have convened a regional high political level summit and
dealt with the democracy problem while also requesting all countries to
do their part in addressing the interim refugee flow. We might have es-
tablished a safe-haven zone in Haiti on the Dominican border to keep
refugees from fleeing by boat. We should have carefully maintained the
possibility of military intervention, to avoid sending a signal to the coup
leaders that we were not serious. Most importantly, we should not have
adopted a neutral position between a legitimately elected government,
supported by almost 68% of the Haitian people, and an illegal regime of
military thugs engaged in human rights violations.
What did we do? We started low-with moral condemnation, some
regional approaches, and weak economic sanctions. But, when refugees
started to arrive, we began to view the refugees, not the restoration of
democracy, as the problem. We abandoned the safe-haven principle and
we began taking action against the refugees by imprisoning them on
Guantanamo. 26 To justify returning the refugees to Haiti, we claimed
25. Warren Christopher, Human Rights and the National Interest, U.S. Dep't of State,
Current Policy No. 2-6 (1980) at 1.
26. During our litigation, I never had any opposition to running a legitimate refugee
camp on Guantanamo. My problem with Guantanamo was setting up a camp there that
operated like a prisoner-of-war camp, guarded by United States military, where people
fleeing from persecution were treated as if they had done criminal wrongs and were denied
the most basic due process rights given to any domestic criminal defendants.
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that, in fact, conditions in Haiti were safer than we had previously stated.
Our reporting, certifying, and monitoring activities became duplicitous.
We undercut international legal standards at home. We defended illegal
violations of international treaties before our courts and violated the
principle of non-neutrality. Nor did the situation improve after the op-
posing sides met at Governor's Island to attempt a compromise. The
United States acted as a broker, not as an advocate of democracy, cutting
a deal between the legitimately elected government and the coup leaders.
The United States agreed to lift the embargo before the democratic gov-
ernment returned to Haiti, thus allowing the Haitian military to spend six
months stockpiling oil. The United States insisted on amnesty for gross
human rights abuses, effectively eliminating any incentive for the military
officials to discontinue these abuses. Our government suggested that the
military regime retire to civilian life rather than demanding its departure
as the United States previously did, for example, with Ferdinand Marcos,
Jean-Claude Duvalier, and General Prosper Avril. We ignored human
rights abuses while the United States negotiations continued. Then
deaths occurred. People were killed. Supporters of the democratic gov-
ernment were shot in the street, including Guy Malary, Aristide's Justice
Minister. From the United States came relatively mild protests, until fi-
nally, as the deadline for returning the Aristide government approached,
we sent two hundred American soldiers with sidearms to Haiti with the
announced mission of training the Haitian military to become civilian po-
lice officers. When Haitians protested at the dock, we turned our boat
around and departed. Our boats now stand in a blockade stopping Hai-
tian oil exports, while also returning Haitian refugees to their
persecutors. 27
The irony, of course, is that the Haitian situation was a textbook oppor-
tunity for an intelligent democracy-and-human-rights policy. In fact, the
Haitian situation has led to an upside-down policy, where we are now
tougher on the refugees than we are on the regime. What this reveals
about the Clinton policy is that although our leaders talk about "growing
democracies," they seem to have no conception of how to do it. They
have no real idea how to support the development of viable institutions,
nor do they seem willing to commit the necessary means to accomplish
such development.
In Somalia, we similarly started with a humanitarian mission, but no
real sense of how to build democracy. We became partisan and personal-
ized the struggle against General Aidid. We came to act as yet another
clan in a group of warring clans until finally, our goal became simply to
remove all of our own troops by a certain date. Bosnia presents a differ-
ent, more complicated, political, military, and human rights situation.
27. Significantly, several months after this lecture, in July 1994, the United States fi-
nally put in place a Haiti policy that incorporated nearly all of the basic principles outlined
here. In September, 1994, after that policy had been in place for only a few months, the




Again the core problem was inapt neutrality. An arms embargo imposed
to help encourage negotiations and contain the violence, in fact, denied
one side access to needed weapons. We then essentially stood back and
remained neutral in the face of conceded genocide, mass rape, and tor-
ture by all sides.
Let us also consider China. On the one hand, we are saying that the
situation in China constitutes such a massive abuse of human rights that
we will consider not renewing China's Most-Favored-Nation status. But
then, when Chinese refugees come on the high seas, we return them to
China. What about the notion of supporting principles and not leaders?
We have refused to act, even at Level One, to make powerful public con-
demnations of actions by the Mexican government in Chiapas, anti-dem-
ocratic actions by Boris Yeltsin in Russia, and anti-democratic and human
rights abuses in Saudi Arabia, or even in Israel. So much for the third
criterion, Intervention.
What is our score card on Accountability, the fourth criterion? The
United States established a slow-moving War Crimes Commission and a
War Crimes Tribunal regarding the Bosnian situation that have yet to
show their true colors. 28 We have pursued a Claims Compensation Com-
mission against Iraq, but have persisted in urging grants of amnesty in the
Haitian situation.29
Finally, what is the grade on the fifth criterion, Preventive Measures
designed to forestall future human rights abuses? The Clinton Adminis-
tration's officials have taken numerous aggressive actions, which should
be applauded. The officials have moved to ratify a number of treaties
that have been left unratified to this point-the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the Conventions on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women and All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The adminis-
tration has advocated a Commissioner for Human Rights for the United
Nations, which has now been established, and argued against the princi-
ple of cultural relativism at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights.
What is wrong with this way of promoting human rights? If we do not
back up our rhetoric with action in one context, namely intervention, it
will quickly ring hollow in the context of preventive measures. For exam-
ple, why is it that the United States government promotes the creation of
a United Nations Commissioner of Human Rights when the United Na-
tions High Commissioner on Refugees has condemned our actions re-
garding Haiti and we have ignored her protests? Why do we say that we
are going to ratify and respect the American Convention on Human
Rights when the American Human Rights System has condemned our
actions on Haiti and we have not responded? Preventive measures alone
28. At this writing, a similar war crimes tribunal is being contemplated to address
atrocities in Rwanda.
29. The United States averted invading Haiti in the fall of 1994 by agreeing to a legis-
lative amnesty for coup leaders, so long as it is enacted before October 15, 1994.
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cannot overcome the kind of problems that we are having because we fail
to think coherently about what we are trying to accomplish with a human
rights policy.
Finally, we have the blow-back effect. What happens when interna-
tional human rights abuses abroad come home? The Clinton Administra-
tion, I think, started well in the area of reproductive freedom, but faltered
on the issues of immigration reform and gays in the military. The admin-
istration is now proposing a foolish filing fee for refugees to participate in
the asylum process that adds a pointless second level of bureaucracy to
address the question of whether or not these charges are to be waived.
Our government is "nickel and diming" freedom for no obvious gain.30
Of course, the Clinton Administration cannot solely be faulted. Congress
has been pathetically passive on Haiti, in contrast to the way it forced the
President's hand on South Africa, Indonesia, and China. The courts have
been predictably deferential, as is illustrated by the Haitian refugee case
at the Supreme Court. That is, of course, why the President almost al-
ways wins in foreign affairs.
But certainly we should aspire to more. Our nation should support
elected democracies, promote human rights, exert moral leadership, and
promote a humanitarian, yet realistic, policy toward refugees. The end of
the cold war presented this administration with an opportunity that its
predecessor never recognized nor seized. The Clinton Administration
has thus far taken few better steps to deal with that problem. When we
say that human rights are not in our national interest, we show only that
we have not yet modified our narrow notion of national interest to incor-
porate the international interest in promoting international human rights
for both instrumental and intrinsic reasons.
What the Haitian case taught me is that human rights violations are not
just things that happen to other people. In the faces of the Haitians, I saw
the faces of my own parents. If you or one of your forebears ever was a
refugee, then you, too, are a Haitian. If you ever lived in an internment
30. If the United States government wants to change the asylum system, the first and
most obvious way is to put money into hiring more asylum officers who can process people
quickly. The solution that has been adopted instead is not to increase the asylum corps,
but to impose a charge on refugees seeking access to the asylum system, which denies them
work permits for a period of six months. What will this accomplish? Most likely, bona fide
refugees will engage in work fraud, sneak into the system, and avoid all kinds of connec-
tions with the legal system. Those who proceed will often claim a waiver of the filing fee
because they are too poor, forcing the Immigration and Naturalization Service to evaluate
their poverty, wasting everyone's time. The filing fee may satisfy some constituencies that
do not like refugees, but it does not serve our actual goal, namely, separating political
refugees from economic refugees.
In any event, political refugee determinations should be made on an individualized basis.
We cannot make blanket assumptions that everybody from a particular country, such as
Haiti, is an economic refugee. Under the direct return system we had for many months, if
President Aristide came on a boat, he would have been returned, even though he clearly
has a well-founded fear of political persecution in Haiti. If the United States is going to
stop and return Haitians, it must assess their individual claims for political refugee status,
not make some irrebuttable presumption that all are economic migrants, based solely on
the fact that they happen to be Haitian.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
camp or knew someone who was held in an internment camp, then you
are a Haitian. If you ever were discriminated against because you had a
disease, then you are a Haitian. If you ever believed that the inscriptions
on the Statue of Liberty are not just words, but embody an enduring
moral principle, then you are a Haitian. When I argued at the Supreme
Court, it occurred to me that the way our government was able to dehu-
manize these people and deny them their basic human rights was by cre-
ating a sense of "we" and "they." After all, if these poor people are not
"us," they are not our problem. After all, don't we have enough
problems of our own? To remove this sense of "we" versus "they," I
decided to close my argument by saying, "Your Honors, ours is a nation
of refugees. Most of our ancestors came here by boat. If they can do this
to the Haitians, they could do this to any of us."'31 I wanted the Justices
to remember, for just a second, that the Haitians are us. The refugee
story is our story. By reliving the case, not only did I relive my own life in
this country, but also our country relived its own past once again. I
hoped to remind them that even in this new world disorder, with all of its
challenges and complications, we must still promote a foreign policy that
treasures and protects both democracy and human rights.
Thank you.
31. Transcript of Supreme Court Argument at 22, Mar. 2, 1993, Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
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